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Abstract 
Mobile money schemes have grown rapidly in some developing countries but failed in many more. This paper 
reports the results of an empirical study of mobile money schemes in 22 developing countries chosen based 
on prior evidence to include roughly equal numbers of successes and failures. It uses a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative evidence to determine why some countries succeeded in launching mobile money 
schemes and others failed. The analysis is guided by multi-sided platform economics and in particular recent 
work on the role of ignition and critical mass. We found that of the 22 countries, mobile money schemes 
have grown rapidly in 8; mobile money schemes have grown but not rapidly in 3; and mobile money schemes 
have largely failed to take hold in 8. (It is still too soon for us to make a call in 2 countries and there are no 
bases to determine ignition for 1 country.) Based on a detailed investigation into the similarities and 
differences between these countries and across the categories we reached several key findings. The first 
finding is the most robust and important. (1) Heavy regulation, and in particular an insistence that banks play 
a central role in the schemes, together with burdensome KYC and agent restrictions, is generally fatal to 
igniting mobile money schemes. (2) Mobile money schemes have been more likely to succeed in poorer 
countries that lack basic infrastructure. (3) The growth of the send-receive and the cash-in/cash-out 
platforms must go hand in hand. (4) Ignition and explosive growth occurs quickly or not at all.  
______________________________________ 
*David S. Evans is Founder, Market Platform Dynamics; Executive Director, Jevons Institute for Competition Law and Economics, 
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I. Introduction 
 
Many countries have seen the launch of mobile money schemes in the last decade. In a handful of 
those countries, one or more of the schemes ignited and grew explosively and, as a result, a significant 
fraction of the population uses mobile money for sending and receiving money and in some cases for other 
financial services. Unfortunately, most mobile money schemes have not ignited and, as a result, in most 
countries only a small portion of the population uses mobile money if they have access to mobile money at 
all.1 The causes of success and failure are not patently obvious. People are, for example, using mobile phones 
to send and receive money in Zimbabwe where the schemes ignited, but not in South Africa, its much 
wealthier neighbor, where the schemes fizzled. 
This paper explores the factors that lead to success or failure of mobile money schemes in 
developing countries. We focus on these poorer countries because we are interested in the role of mobile 
money schemes for creating financial services platforms in countries where many people lack access to banks. 
We also focus on mobile money schemes in poorer countries because the ones in developed countries are 
competing with highly efficient electronic payment systems including cards and most people have access to 
banks. Mobile money schemes in developed countries face different challenges than those in developing 
countries and are therefore not comparable. 
The empirical study is based on an analysis of 22 developing countries in which mobile schemes have 
been introduced in the last decade. The countries were chosen to include roughly equal numbers of successes 
and failures based on a preliminary look at the evidence. They include 14 in Africa, 5 in Asia, and 3 in Latin 
America.  
Mobile money schemes are based on two related platforms. One is the electronic money platform 
that connects senders and receivers of mobile money. The other is the agent platform that enables people to 
put cash into or take money out of mobile money accounts; the agent platform is known as the Cash-
In/Cash-Out (CICO) platform. The recent economic literature on multi-sided platforms provides a 
framework for analyzing the mobile-money platforms.2 Mobile money schemes developing countries are 
three-sided platforms consisting of senders, receivers, and agents. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Claire Pénicaud, and Arunjay Katakam, State of the Industry 2013: Mobile Financial Services for the unbanked. GSMA 14 (2013). Available 
at: http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/SOTIR_2013.pdf 
2 The economics of two-sided platforms was first presented in a pioneering paper by Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, Platform 
Competition in Two-Sided Markets 1(4) EUROPEAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL (2003). 
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The empirical analysis relies heavily on two related concepts from the multi-sided platform 
literature—ignition and critical mass. 3 Platforms typically grow slowly at first until they obtain enough 
participants (“critical mass”) at which point begin to grow explosively (“ignite”). Platforms that do not reach 
critical mass soon enough in their lives typically sputter and eventually fail. Figure 1 illustrates typical paths 
for ignition and implosion. 
For each of the countries we collected information from diverse sources on the penetration of 
mobile money schemes. We examined the percent of adults that had a mobile money account, had used that 
account recently, and had used mobile money either with their own account or at an agent. We also 
considered mobile money transactions as a percent of GDP. We assembled this information over time. To 
compare the evolution of mobile money schemes in these countries we identified when mobile money 
schemes first started, took that as the birth of the mobile money ecosystem, and then compared countries at 
similar ages for the mobile money ecosystem.   
 Using the best information available we then made a determination as to how successful mobile 
money schemes were in the country. After examining the data we classified countries into four categories: 
those that ignited and had explosive growth; those that had ignited but with slower growth; those that had 
failed; and those that were so early in their evolution that it was not possible to make a determination. Our 
classifications were judgmental because data were not available consistently across countries. However, in 
most cases the data left little doubt as to what category the country fell into to. The successes and failures 
were obvious. 
Table 1 summarizes our findings on ignition or not. Of the 22 countries we concluded that 8 have 
ignited strongly; 3 have ignited but weakly so; and 8 have sputtered. It is still too soon for us to make a call in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 David S. Evans, How Catalyst Ignite: The Economics of Platform-Based Start-Ups, in PLATFORM, MARKETS AND INNOVATION, (Annabelle 
Gawer, ed. 2009). Available at SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1279631 and David S. Evans and Richard 
Schmalensee, Failure to Launch: Critical Mass in Platform Businesses. 9(4) REVIEW OF NETWORK ECONOMICS (2010). Available at: 
http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/rne.2010.9.4/rne.2010.9.4.1256/rne.2010.9.4.1256.xml 
Figure 1. Ignition and Implosion 
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2 countries and there are no bases to determine ignition for 1 country. Seven of the 8 countries that had 
ignition with explosive growth were located in Africa. Mobile money schemes in 4 other countries on that 
continent have failed including Nigeria, the largest and most populous African nation, and South Africa, the 
wealthiest African country.   
 
Table 1. Mobile Money Scheme Successes and Failures 
Ignition with 
Explosive Growth 
Ignition with 
Weak Growth 
Failed to 
Ignite 
Too Soon to Assess 
Ignition 
No Basis 
Bangladesh Ghana Burkina Faso Democratic Republic 
of the Congo 
Paraguay 
Cote D’Ivoire Philippines Haiti Sri Lanka  
Kenya Pakistan India   
Rwanda  Indonesia   
Somaliland  Madagascar   
Tanzania  Mexico   
Uganda  Nigeria   
Zimbabwe  South Africa   
 
Based on a detailed investigation into the similarities and differences between these countries and 
across the categories we reached several key findings. The first finding is the most robust and important. 
(1) Heavy regulation is usually fatal to igniting mobile money schemes in a country. 
The key difference between the countries that clearly succeeded and clearly failed is stark. 
All but one of the eight countries that ignited and grew explosively had relatively light 
regulation on mobile money schemes. Only one of those required the mobile money 
schemes involve a bank for anything other than just hold funds. Seven of the countries 
imposed minimal limitations on who could operate a mobile money scheme and all 
generally had relatively light KYC requirements and minimal restrictions on who could 
serve as an agent. All but one of the eight countries that have failed to ignite had 
relatively heavy regulation on mobile money schemes. They required that banks take the 
lead role in operating the mobile money scheme and conversely prohibited mobile 
network operators from doing so. They then typically imposed other heavy burdens 
including stringent KYC requirements and restrictions on who could operate as an agent. 
 
(2) Mobile money schemes are more likely to succeed in poorer countries that lack 
basic infrastructure and where mobile money schemes therefore create more 
value by reducing a greater friction.4  Poorer countries are more likely to have 
successful mobile money schemes. Median per capita GDP is US$1,007 for the countries !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 We do not have enough data to distinguish the contribution of poor infrastructure from light regulation. It is possible, for example, 
that countries that are more desperate for a financial service solution are more willing to try a light regulatory regime figuring they 
have little to lose. 
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in which mobile money schemes have ignited with explosive growth, US$1,871 for the 
countries in which mobile money schemes have ignited with slow growth, and US$2,296 
for the countries in which mobile money schemes have not ignited.  The countries where 
mobile money schemes ignited have limited transportation and banking systems.   
 
(3) The growth of the send-receive and CICO platform must go hand in hand. The 
density of the CICO network and the success of the send-receive platform are highly 
correlated across these countries. The median density for the countries that ignited with 
fast growth is 27.6 agents per 10,000 adults, compared with 9.5 for the countries that 
ignited with slow growth, and 2.7 for the countries that have not ignited. The simple 
correlation between active mobile subscribers per capita and agents per 10,000 adults is 
0.79.  
 
(4) Ignition and explosive growth occurs quickly or not at all. Based on our qualitative 
assessment of when ignition occurred, for the countries with ignition and explosive 
growth the median time to ignition was 17 months and the longest time was in Tanzania 
with ignition between 36 and 48 months, and for the countries with ignition and slower 
growth the median time to ignition was 16 months and the longest time was between 36 
and 48 months. By contrast, mobile money schemes have been in existence in countries 
in which none have ignited for a median of 63 months with the longest 122 months. 
 
II. Ignition and Growth for Multi-Sided Platforms 
Economists define a “two-sided platform” as an entity that (a) enables members of two distinct 
groups; (b) that “need” each other to secure value for themselves; (c) to get together; and (d) engage in 
mutually beneficial exchange. They typically have positive feedback effects in the sense that members of one 
group value the platform more if they can interact with more members of the other group, and vice versa.5 
The very feature, however, that enables platform businesses to create significant value—getting 
trading partners together—also makes it very difficult to create a successful platform business. To create any 
value at all these platforms need to attract both sides. Buyers wouldn’t bother with an online shopping site 
that didn’t have many sellers and sellers wouldn’t bother with a reservation platform that didn’t have many 
buyers. Platforms need to solve what economists call a “demand coordination problem” and what business 
writers often refer to as the “chicken-and-egg problem.” 
It turns out that platform ignition, demand coordination, and value-creation, are closely related.6 The 
ability of a platform to create value ultimately determines whether it can attract participants to its platform 
and ultimately earn return on its investment and risk. The platform can secure ignition only if it attracts 
enough participants for them to obtain enough value to want to participate in the platform. It can succeed in 
tracking enough participants only if it can solve the demand coordination problem. Whether the platform can 
create a profitable return on the investment and risk it takes on in turn depends not only on whether the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Symmetric positive feedback effects are not, however, a necessary condition for a business to be a platform. For example, 
advertising-support media are two-sided platforms and in some cases consumers dislike the advertisements. 
6 See DAVID S. EVANS, AND RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, CATALYST CODE: THE STRATEGIES BEHIND THE WORLD´S MOST DYNAMIC 
COMPANIES. (Harvard Business School Press, 2007). 
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platform is capable of creating significant value through removing frictions, but also on whether the platform 
can solve the related demand-coordination and ignition problems that are predicates to creating a viable 
platform. 
Successful platforms follow a typical pattern: they grow slowly at first; they then reach an inflection 
point; and they grow explosively after passing through that inflection point. Economists have studied what’s 
behind these patterns.7 Simply put, platforms face a “critical mass” problem similar to nuclear fission. When a 
platform starts it will typically get some early adopters who try it out just because they like to try new things 
or perhaps because they have a particular need that the platform can meet. If the platform enables these early 
adopters to generate value others will see that and join as well. As they do, the early adopters are more likely 
to stay with the platform because its value increases as they get to interact with more newcomers. If the 
growth of participants is slow, however, the earlier adopters will lose interest and drop off the platform. As 
more desert, however, the value declines to new participants. To be successful, a platform usually needs to 
grow rapidly enough to maintain current interest and attract new interest. 
Platforms may reach a point of “critical mass” at which the value of existing participants is so great 
that it attracts new participants at a significantly higher rate than it loses current participants. After this point 
is reached the platform will typically grow explosively because, as a result of positive feedback effects, more 
participants enable the platform to create more value which attracts more participants which makes the 
platform even more valuable. This is the point of “inflection.”  
Of course platforms may struggle to reach critical mass. In that case the platform will get to a point 
where more early adopters leave the platform than new adopters join. As a result, the value of the platform 
declines. But as the value declines there is even less of an incentive for new adopters to join. Positive 
feedback effects work in reverse. The platform fizzles (enters slow decline) or implodes (fast decline).  !
III. Data Collection Ignition and Growth for Mobile Money Schemes !
Data on the success of mobile money schemes is scarce and spotty. There is no centralized source of 
data that tracks mobile money transactions across countries and over time. Given the availability of 
information, our analysis of success and failure required us to conduct research to develop data and 
information for each country considered. To manage this task we chose 22 developing countries in which 
mobile money schemes were introduced and for which there would likely be data on their growth. We chose 
the 22 countries to ensure that we would have, based on preliminary research, countries in which mobile 
money schemes succeeded and countries in which they did not so that we could delve into the sources of 
success and failure. As a result of our subsequent analysis we ended up classifying these countries into four 
categories: 
Table 2 lists the 22 countries and some basic details on them. There is great socioeconomic diversity 
among these countries even though most are developing countries and none are developed. Paraguay, with 
6.8 million people is the smallest, and India with 1.3 billion people is the largest. While none are rich, per 
capita GDP varies from a low of $388 per capita in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to $10,650 in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 David S. Evans, How Catalyst Ignite: The Economics of Platform-Based Start-Ups, in PLATFORM, MARKETS AND INNOVATION, (Annabelle 
Gawer, ed. 2009). Available at SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1279631 and David S. Evans and Richard 
Schmalensee, Failure to Launch: Critical Mass in Platform Businesses. 9(4) REVIEW OF NETWORK ECONOMICS (2010). Available at: 
http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/rne.2010.9.4/rne.2010.9.4.1256/rne.2010.9.4.1256.xml  
! 7!
Mexico. Mobile phones are prevalent in all of them with the lowest penetration, 36 percent of people, in 
Madagascar. Less than half of adults have a bank account in all but two of the countries. There are fewer than 
10 bank branches per 100,000 adults in 18 of the 22 countries.  
For each of these countries we collected information from diverse sources on the penetration of 
mobile money schemes. We examined the percent of adults that had a mobile money account, had used that 
account recently, and had used mobile money either with their own account or at an agent. We also 
considered mobile money transactions as a percent of GDP. We also collected data on the extent of the 
CICO network since that is an integral part of any mobile money scheme. We assembled this information 
over time. To compare the evolution of mobile money schemes in these countries we identified when mobile 
money schemes first started in the country to determine the birth of the mobile money ecosystem and then 
compared countries at similar ages when possible.   
 Using the best information available we then made a determination as to how successful mobile 
money schemes were in the country. After examining the data we classified countries into four categories: 
those that ignited and had explosive growth; those that had ignited but with slower growth; those that had 
failed; and those that were so early in their evolution that it was not possible to make a determination. Our 
classifications were judgmental because data were not available consistently across countries. However, in 
most cases the data left little doubt as to what category the country fell into to. The successes and failures 
were obvious in most cases.   
 
Table 2. Socioeconomic Data on Countries Selected for Analysis 
Country  Population8 GDP per capita 
(current US$ of 
2013)9 
Mobile Phone 
Subscriptions 
per Capita10 
Commercial 
Bank Branches 
per 100,000 
Adults 11 
Bank Account 
Penetration (% 
of adults)12 
Bangladesh 156,594,962 1,033 0.67 8.1 39.6 
Burkina Faso 16,934,839 711 0.66 - 13.4 
Cote d'Ivoire 20,316,086 1,332 0.95 4.6  
Congo, Dem. Rep. 67,513,677 388 0.44 0.7 3.7 
Ghana 25,904,598 1,871 1.08 5.7 29.4 
Haiti 10,317,461 820 0.69 2.7 22.0 
India 1,252,139,596 1,509 0.71 11.4 35.2 
Indonesia 249,865,631 3,510 1.22 9.6 19.6 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Population, total, World Bank (2013). Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL  
9  GDP per capita (current US$), International Monetary Fund (2013). Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/index.aspx  
10  Population, total, World Bank (2013). Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL and Mobile Cellular 
subscriptions, World Bank (2013). Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.CEL.SETS  
11  Commercial bank branches (per 100,000 adults), World Bank (2012). Available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.CBK.BRCH.P5  
12  Account at a formal financial institution (% age 15+), World Bank Findex (2011). Available at: 
http://datatopics.worldbank.org/financialinclusion/  
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Country  Population8 GDP per capita 
(current US$ of 
2013)9 
Mobile Phone 
Subscriptions 
per Capita10 
Commercial 
Bank Branches 
per 100,000 
Adults 11 
Bank Account 
Penetration (% 
of adults)12 
Kenya 44,353,691 1,316 0.71 5.5 42.3 
Madagascar 22,924,851 463 0.36 1.7 5.5 
Mexico 122,332,399 10,650 0.86 14.5 27.4 
Nigeria 173,615,345 3,082 0.73 5.8 29.7 
Pakistan 182,142,594 1,275 0.70 9.0 10.3 
Paraguay 6,802,295 4,281 1.04 9.7 21.7 
Philippines 98,393,574 2,791 1.05 8.1 26.6 
Rwanda 11,776,522 704 0.57 7.6 32.8 
Somalia13 10,495,583  0.49 - 31.0 
South Africa 52,981,991 6,621 1.47 10.4 53.6 
Sri Lanka 20,483,000 3,204 0.99 17.5 68.5 
Tanzania 49,253,126 719 0.56 2.2 17.3 
Uganda 37,578,876 623 0.44 2.6 20.5 
Zimbabwe 14,149,648 1,007 0.96 7.1 39.7 
 
To assess factors that could lead to success or failure we collected information on several aspects of 
the mobile money scheme that is based on the research discussed in part in the previous section and that 
could be relevant to the success of the schemes in a country. 
• The regulatory framework: The regulatory framework adopted by the government, in 
particular, the extent to which regulations restrict potential players, in particular mobile 
network operators (MNOs), from operating mobile money schemes and the extent to which 
regulations impose obligations, such as interoperability, on the schemes that could facilitate 
or restrain success. 
• The market structure: The market structure that evolved including the types of players, such 
as banks, MNO, and neither; the relationship between the scheme leader and the banks and 
MNO (both of which are usually necessary components); how the CICO network is 
organized; and the extent to which the market is fragmented among multiple players; and 
how multiple players work with each other, if at all. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 The country under analysis in this study is Somaliland, which separate from Somalia, but it is not still recognized by the 
international community as a country, so there is not official information about it. We use Somalia as an approximation. 
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• The products offered and used: The products that the mobile schemes offer (send-receive, 
bill pay, and so forth), the extent to which people use these various products, and the extent 
to which the products solve significant transaction cost problems for people in the country. 
 
IV. Statistical Overview of the Success and Failure of Mobile Money Schemes 
  
We begin the analysis by reporting metrics of success. Table 3 lists the countries in alphabetical order 
along with the year in which mobile money schemes started in that country. For each country it reports the 
most recent available data on the percent of registered subscribers; the percent of active subscribers; the 
percent of adult users; and transactions as a percent of GDP. Most countries do not have all of these 
measures available. Since these data are not available for most years for most countries we have reported the 
most recent data for the country.  Table 3 presents the core empirical findings on success or failure that 
provide the foundation for the remainder of the analysis. 
To help interpret the data, and compare the success of countries, after each of these success metrics 
we show in parentheses the number of years since the start of mobile money that has elapsed since the date 
of the metric. For example, in the case of Rwanda we find that 53 percent of mobile phone users were 
registered mobile money subscribers 4 years after the launch of the first MMP; 59.4 percent of the adult 
population were registered users after 4 years; 25.4 percent of mobile phone subscribers were active users of 
mobile money services after 3 years; mobile money amounted to 2.6 percent of GDP after 3 years; and there 
were 21.2 agents for per 10,000 adults 4 years after the start of the first MMP.  
It is clear, of course, that mobile schemes in Kenya have succeeded and that those in Madagascar 
have not so far. However, the extent to which mobile money schemes are succeeding is less apparent in many 
other countries given the inconsistency in the data for these countries, particularly at a similar time in their 
evolutions. We have combined the data shown in the table with information from other sources to reach a 
determination for each country. That finding is shown in the last column of the table. Appendix A presents 
more details on why we have made each of these judgments based on a combination of the available hard 
data and anecdotal information.14 Of the 22 countries we conclude that 8 have ignited strongly; 3 have ignited 
but weakly so; 8 have sputtered. It is still too soon for us to make a call in 2 countries and there are no bases 
to determine ignition for 1 country. 
We now turn to a series of qualitative assessments designed to identify possible factors behind 
success and failure. Table 4a-4d list the countries grouped into the four success categories and listed 
alphabetically within each. For each country, Table 4 describes the regulatory framework, and our judgment 
on the length of time that it took for mobile money schemes in the country to reach critical mass and ignite, 
and the density of the CICO network. It also shows the GDP of the country and the GDP rank out of all 
countries. The methodology on how we measure the length of time it took each scheme to reach critical mass 
is detailed in Appendix B.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 The classification was based on the growth trajectory of mobile payments. Although we had to rely on different measures of this 
trajectory depending on data availability the trajectories generally provided an unambiguous classification into the four categories 
described above. 
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Table 3. Current State of Mobile Money Deployments in Countries under Analysis15 
Country Launch of 
First MMP 
Registered Users as 
Percent of Mobile 
Phone Users 
Active Users as 
Percent of 
Mobile Phone 
Users 
Registered Users 
as Percent of 
Adult Population 
Transactions 
as Percent of 
GDP 
Agents per 
10,000 
adults 
Evaluation of 
Success 
Bangladesh16 Mar-11 22.2% (3) 10.5% (3) 22.8% (3) 1% (2) 50.83 (3) Explosive Ignition 
Burkina Faso17 Dec-08 0.8% (2)   0.7% (2)     Failed 
Cote D’ Ivoire18 Dec-08 31.8% (5) 10.9% (5) 54.7% (5) 7.9% (5) 10.73 (5) Explosive Ignition 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo19 
Feb-12 9.5% (1) 1.3% (1) 7.5% (1) 0.8% (1) 8.81 (1) Too soon to tell 
Ghana20 Jun-09 19.3% (5)   35.9% (5)     Weak Ignition 
Haiti21 Feb-11 9.8% (2) 0.8% (4)  10.4% (2)   2.16 (1) Failed 
India22 Nov-07   1.0% (6)    1.83 (6)  Failed 
Indonesia23 Nov-07 7.9% (6) 1.2% (4) 14.5% (6)     Failed 
Kenya24 Mar-07 83.7% (7) 39.9% (7) 102.2% (7) 49.3% (6) 48.46 (7) Explosive Ignition 
Madagascar25 Jun-10 20.6% (3)  1.7% (3) 12.9% (3)    3.43 (3) Failed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Mobile Cellular Subscriptions, World Bank (2013). Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.CEL.SETS; Population ages 15-64 (% of total), World Bank (2013). Available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.1564.TO.ZS; Population ages 65 and above (% of total), World Bank (2013). Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.65UP.TO.ZS; 
Population, total, World Bank (2013). Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL and MMU Deployment Tracker, GSMA. Available at: 
http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/programmes/mobile-money-for-the-unbanked/insights/tracker 
16  Mobile Financial Services (MFS) comparative summary statement of October, 2014 and November 2014, CENTRAL BANK OF BANGLADESH. Available at: http://www.bangladesh-
bank.org/fnansys/paymentsys/20141218_mfs.pdf  
17  INOVA: A Home Grown Mobile Money service in West Africa, UNDP (2011). Available at: 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/Partnerships/Private%20Sector/AFIMcases/UNDP%20GIM%20Case%20Study%20Inova%20Final.pdf  
18  Overview of Cote D’Ivoire: Mobile Financial Services Market Data 2013, IFC (2013). Available at: 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/60efa900461a20518634bf9916182e35/ifc_emoney_english.pdf?MOD=AJPERES  
19  Simone Di Castri, Enabling Mobile Money Policies in the Democratic Republic of Congo, GSMA (2014). Available at: http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/Enabling-Mobile-Money-Policies-in-the-Democratic-Republic-Of-Congo.pdf. There is additional data from IMF FAS that presents that there are 8,126,599 registered 
users, 1,076,653 active users and 1,293 active agents in the country by the end of 2013. Both sources use data from Banque Centrale du Congo, but we decided to use GSMA data, since IMF 
FAS data presented inconsistencies in the number of agents according to the level of development of mobile money deployments.  
20 Yaw Owusu-Agyeman and Abena Offe, Mobile Money Payments in Ghana: Part Two, Public Intervention, IMTFI, April 7, 2014. Available at: http://blog.imtfi.uci.edu/2014/04/mobile-money-
payments-in-ghana-part-two.html  
21 Erik Heinrich, Haiti´s Mobile Redemption, FORTUNE, August 15, 2013. Available at: http://fortune.com/2013/08/15/haitis-mobile-redemption/ and Ángel González, Push to Make Haiti an e-cash 
Economy Fell Far Short, THE SEATTLE TIMES, January 10, 2015. Available at: http://seattletimes.com/flatpages/nationworld/haiti-shaky-recovery-part-2-earthquake-five-years-later-annivers.html   
22 Data corresponds to only one of the active MMPs in the country, which is called Money-on-Mobile (MoM). Data for the rest of the MMPs is very outdated. Therefore information presented 
understates the total subscribers of mobile money in deployments in India. India Could Surpass Kenya in Mobile Money Market: Clocked 67.5 Million Unique Users By August 2013, DAZINFO, September 
17, 2013. Available at: http://dazeinfo.com/2013/09/17/india-surpass-kenya-mobile-money-market-clocked-67-5-million-unique-users-august-2013/ and Calpian Steady Domestic Cashflow + Money 
on Mobile Explosive International Growth, SEC. Available at: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1414628/000135448813005155/clpi_ex991.htm  
23 Accelerating Mobile Money in Indonesia: Opportunity Assessment, USAID (2011). Available at: http://egateg.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/D1.%20FS%20Share_Opportunity_Assessment_Final.pdf 
and Financial Access Survey, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. Available at: http://fas.imf.org/Default.aspx  
24 Payments System Statistics: Mobile Payments, Central Bank of Kenya. Available at: https://www.centralbank.go.ke/index.php/nps-modernization/mobile-payments and Brian Muthiora, New 
Infographic: Mobile Money and the Digitisation of Kenya´s Retail Payments Systems, GSMA, September 29, 2014. Available at: http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/new-infographic-mobile-
money-and-the-digitisation-of-kenyas-retail-payments-systems.  
25 Corinne Riquet, Small Farmers, Mobile Banking, Financial Inclusion in Madagascar, CGAP, October 28, 2013. Available at: http://www.cgap.org/blog/small-farmers-mobile-banking-financial-
inclusion-madagascar and Financial Access Survey, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. Available at: http://fas.imf.org/Default.aspx  
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Country Launch of 
First MMP 
Registered Users as 
Percent of Mobile 
Phone Users 
Active Users as 
Percent of 
Mobile Phone 
Users 
Registered Users 
as Percent of 
Adult Population 
Transactions 
as Percent of 
GDP 
Agents per 
10,000 
adults 
Evaluation of 
Success 
Mexico26 Jan-12  2.6% (1)    3.4% (1)   3.26 (1)  Failed 
Nigeria27 Feb-11 5.4% (2) 0.3% (2)  7.5% (2)   3.65 (2)  Failed 
Pakistan28 Oct-09 3.3% (5) 1.5% (5) 3.7% (5) 5.1% (4) 14.98 (5) Weak Ignition 
Paraguay29 Jul-10   0.9% (2)      Insufficient Info30 
Philippines31 Oct-04 7.8% (9) 5.2% (9) 13.2% (9) 2% (5) 3.94 (9) Weak Ignition 
Rwanda32 Feb-10 53.0% (4) 25.4% (3)  59.4% (4) 2.6% (3) 21.22 (4) Explosive Ignition 
Somaliland33 Jun-09 33.1% (4)  24.2% (4)      Explosive Ignition 
South Africa34 Nov-04 3.5% (8) 0.3% (8)  7.3% (8)   1.06 (8) Failed 
Sri Lanka35 Jun-12 4.9% (1) 1.0% (1) 7.4% (1) 0.1% (1) 11.40 (1) Too soon to tell 
Tanzania36 Apr-08 115.9% (5) 40.1% (5) 117.1% (5) 53.3% (5) 56.46 (5) Explosive Ignition 
Uganda37 Mar-09 106.2% (5) 9% (3) 90.8% (5) 39.7% (5) 27.62 (4) Explosive Ignition 
Zimbabwe38 Sep-11 30.1% (2) 19.5% (2) 47.9% (2) 22% (1) 8.05 (2) Explosive Ignition 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Financial Access Survey, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. Available at: http://fas.imf.org/Default.aspx 
27 Interviews from McKinsey, November 2013 and Financial Access Survey, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. Available at: http://fas.imf.org/Default.aspx 
28 Quarterly Branchless Banking Newsletter Apr-Jun 2014, STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN, July 2014. Available at: http://www.sbp.org.pk/publications/acd/BranchlessBanking-Apr-Jun-2014.pdf  
29 Camilo Tellez and M. Yasmina McCarty, Mobile Money in Latin America: A Case Study of Tigo Paraguay, GSMA (2012). Available at: http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/tigopyenfinal.pdf  
30 There is very little information available. A report from GSMA in 2012 presented hard data on number of subscribers, but the evolution since then is uncertain. (Camilo Tellez and M. Yasmina 
McCarty, Mobile Money in Latin America: A Case Study of Tigo Paraguay, GSMA (2012). Available at: http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/tigopyenfinal.pdf  
31 Financial Access Survey, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. Available at: http://fas.imf.org/Default.aspx 
32 Annual Report 2013-2014, NATIONAL BANK OF RWANDA (2014). Available at: http://www.bnr.rw/index.php?id=231&eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=1216  
33 Claire Pénicaud and Fionán McGrath, Innovative Inclusion: How Telesom ZAAD Brought Mobile Money to Somaliland, GSMA (2013). Available at: http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/Telesom-Somaliland.pdf  
34  Rajiv Bhatia, Mobile Money Success in South Africa Requires Telco, Bank Tie-Ups, ERICSSON CALL FOR CHANGE BLOG, August 1, 2014. Available at: http://www.ericsson.com/m-
commerce/blog/mobile-money-success-south-africa-requires-telco-bank-tie-ups, WIZZIT, BUSINESS CALL TO ACTION. Available at: 
http://www.businesscalltoaction.org/members/2011/11/wizzit/ and Financial Access Survey, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. Available at: http://fas.imf.org/Default.aspx 
35  Simone Di Castri, Enabling Mobile Money Policies in Sri Lanka: The Rise of eZ Cash, GSMA (2013). Available at: http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/Enabling-Mobile-Money-Policies-in-Sri-Lanka-GSMA-MMU-Case-Study-July2013.pdf  
36  Simone Di Castri and Lara Gidvani, Enabling Mobile Money Policies in Tanzania: A test and learn approach to enabling market-led digital financial services, GSMA (2014). Available at: 
http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Tanzania-Enabling-Mobile-Money-Policies.pdf  
37 Martin Luther Oketch, Registered Mobile Money users Reach 17 Million Mark, DAILY MONITOR, August 8, 2014. Available at: http://www.monitor.co.ug/Business/Registered-mobile-money-users-
reach-17-million-mark/-/688322/2411528/-/rjcg2z/-/index.html, Uganda Mobile Money Assessment and Case Study, USAID (2012). Available at: 
http://solutionscenter.nethope.org/assets/collaterals/Uganda_Market_Assessment_and_Case_Studies_Final.pdf and Financial Access Survey, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. Available at: 
http://fas.imf.org/Default.aspx 
38 4.2m use EcoCash, WEEKENDPOST, June 27, 2014. Available at: http://www.weekendpost.co.zw/articles/2014/06/27/4-2m-use-ecocash, Phil Levin, Big Ambition Meets Effective Execution: How 
EcoCash is Altering Zimbabwe´s Financial Landscape, GSMA (2013). Available at: http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/EcoCash-Zimbabwe.pdf and 
Financial Access Survey, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. Available at: http://fas.imf.org/Default.aspx 
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Table 4a. Countries that Have Ignited Strongly 
Country Regulatory Framework GDP 
(millions 
of 
current 
US$ 
2013) 
GDP 
Rank 
Length 
to Reach 
Critical 
Mass 
Agents 
per 
10,000 
adults 
Agents 
per 100 
Km2!
Has specific mobile 
money regulation? 
Allows Non-Banks to issue 
mobile money? 
Has KYC Requirements? Tiered 
KYC? 
Bangladesh Guideline on Mobile 
Financial Services for 
the Banks, 2011 
Bank-led model only Each mobile money account must 
have all the requirement 
documents (KYC form). 
No KYC Tiers. Banks shall follow 
a full KYC format issued by the 
AML Department.!
161,763 59 Between 
13 and 26 
months 
50.83 (3) 398.8 (3) 
Cote D’Ivoire Regulation of 
Electronic Money of 
BCEAO 
It is allowed, but in practice, 
MNOs participating in the market 
(MTN and Orange), both have 
entered in partnerships with Banks. 
To be identified, customers should 
sign a form, provide a copy of ID 
and a proof of address. Different 
services for identified and 
unidentified customers. 
Identified customers can open e-
wallet with maximum balance of 
$600. Unidentified customers can 
open e-wallet with maximum 
balance of $200. 
32,061 94 45 
months 
10.73 (5) 3.8 (5) 
Kenya E-Money 
Regulations. Central 
Bank of Kenya, 2013 
Banks and non-banks can issue 
electronic money. Non banks shall 
comply with certain conditions 
No KYC tiers. Full KYC 
registration only. Customers can 
register at agent´s stores.  
54,993 77 11 
months 
48.86 (7) 21.82 (7) 
Rwanda Branchless Banking 
Guidelines 
There are non-banks participating 
in the market. No specific 
regulation about it 
 No KYC tiers. Full KYC 
registration only.  Customers can 
register using any ID. 
7,601 142 Between 
29 and 35 
months 
21.22 (4) 55.42 (4) 
 
Somaliland ✗ Allowed of MMPs in practice, not 
stated in regulation 
Compliance by MMPs in practice, 
not by regulation. No basis. 
- - Between 
13 and 15 
months 
 6.25 (4) 
Tanzania Electronic Payment 
Schemes Guidelines 
Banks and non-banks are allowed 
to apply for a electronic payment 
scheme license. 
No KYC tiers. Full KYC 
registration only.  Customers can 
register using any ID with a 
photograph. 
33,285 92 Between 
36 and 42 
months 
56.46 (5) 17.31 (5) 
Uganda Bank of Uganda 
Mobile Money 
Guidelines. 
Non-banks shall partner with a 
financial institution in order to be 
able to issue mobile money. 
No KYC tiers. Full KYC 
registration only.  Customers can 
register using any ID with a 
photograph. 
22,926 104 10 
months 
27.62 (4) 6.05 (4) 
Zimbabwe ✗ Allowed in practice, not stated in 
regulation 
No basis. 13,206 124 2 months 8.05 (2) 1.78 (2) 
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Table 4b. Countries that Have Sputtered 
Country Regulatory Framework GDP 
(millions  
current 
US$ 
2013) 
GDP 
Rank 
Months 
since 
beginning 
Agents 
per 
10,000 
adults 
Agents 
per 100 
Km2 
Has specific Mobile 
Money Regulation? 
Allow Non-Banks to Issue 
Mobile Money? 
Has KYC Requirements? 
Tiered KYC 
Burkina 
Faso 
Regulation of Electronic 
Money of BCEAO. 
It is allowed as a non-banking 
model, by which electronic money 
issuer institutions are authorized by 
Central Bank. In practice Airtel 
Money have entered with a 
partnership with Ecobank. 
No basis. 12,042 127 72 months 
since launch 
  
Haiti Lignes Directrices relatives 
à la Banque à Distance 
(Guidelines of Branchless 
Banking) 
MNO cannot independently brand 
new services. Bank led model only. 
Different types of KYC tiers 
with different requirements 
each.  
Mini-wallet with a transaction 
limit of $63 for T-Cash and 
$101 for TchoTcho. Full wallet 
with transaction limit of $ 252 
8,482 138 47 months 
since launch 
2.16 (1) 5.15 (1) 
India Mobile Payments in India – 
Operative Guidelines for 
Banks, 2008 
Bank led model only.  No tiered KYC. Full KYC 
compliance ensured by banks.39 
1,876,811 10 86 months 
since launch 
1.83 (6) 5.05 (6) 
Indonesia Bank Indonesia Regulation 
11/12/PBI/2009 
Concerning Electronic 
Money 
Bank or non-bank institutions can 
issue electronic money with the 
grant of a license from Central 
Bank. 
Banks cannot outsource KYC 
procedures. For non banks are 
costly and non-feasible. No 
tiered KYC. Full KYC 
compliance.40 
870,275 16 86 months 
after launch 
  
Madagascar ✗ Non-banks should have an 
exclusive partnership with a bank 
to operate. 
No basis 10,645 133 54 months 
after launch 
3.43 (3) 0.78 (3) 
Mexico ✗ The “Niche Bank” system 
encourages non-banks to offer 
financial services. The role of 
MNOs is limited by law. 
Not very restrictive 
identification of customers to 
open an account. No tiered 
KYC. Full KYC compliance 
ensured by banks. 
1,260,915 15 36 months 
since launch 
3.26 (1) 1.33 (1) 
Nigeria Regulatory Framework for 
Mobile Payments in Nigeria 
Non-banks are allowed to issue 
mobile money, except 
telecommunications providers. 
Three tiered KYC 
requirements. Low-value 
account limited to maximum 
single deposit amount of $ 123, 
up to a cumulative maximum of 
$ 1231. Medium value accounts 
limited to $ 308 and $2463 
respectively. High value 
521,812 23 47 months 
since launch 
3.65 (2) 3.68 (2) 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 Mobile Payments in India – Operative Guidelines for Banks, Reserve Bank of India. Available at: http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Content/PDFs/84978.pdf  
40 Update on Regulation of Branchless Banking in Indonesia, CGAP (2010), https://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-Regulation-of-Branchless-Banking-in-Indonesia-Jan-2010.pdf  
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Country Regulatory Framework GDP 
(millions  
current 
US$ 
2013) 
GDP 
Rank 
Months 
since 
beginning 
Agents 
per 
10,000 
adults 
Agents 
per 100 
Km2 
Has specific Mobile 
Money Regulation? 
Allow Non-Banks to Issue 
Mobile Money? 
Has KYC Requirements? 
Tiered KYC 
accounts have no upper 
limits.41 
South 
Africa 
Position Paper Electronic 
Money. Position Paper NPS 
01/2006 
Bank led model Three tiered KYC 
requirements. Low value 
account that allows non-face 
account opening and low 
documentary standards. 
Medium value account that 
allows low documentary 
standards. High value accounts 
with full KYC requirements. 
350,800 33 122 months 
since launch 
1.05 (8) 0.32 (8) 
 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 Kingsley Ighomwenghian, Three-Tiered KYC: CBN Confident on Achieving 2020 Financial Inclusion Target, DAILY INDEPENDENT. Available at: http://dailyindependentnig.com/2014/05/three-
tiered-kyc-cbn-confident-achieving-2020-financial-inclusion-target/  
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Table 4c. Countries That Have Ignited But Weakly So 
Country Regulatory Framework GDP 
(millions 
current 
US$ 
2013) 
GDP 
Rank 
Length to 
Reach 
Critical 
Mass 
Agents 
per 
10,000 
adults 
Agents 
per 100 
Km2 
Has specific Mobile 
Money Regulation? 
Allow Non-Banks to Issue Mobile 
Money? 
Has KYC Requirements? 
Ghana Guidelines for Branchless 
Banking. Notice No. 
BG/GOV/SEC/2008/2
1, 2008. 
Bank-led model KYC due diligence must be 
undertaken on all new 
accounts and one-off cash 
transactions. No tiered KYC 
requirements 
47,830 82 Between 0 
and 25 
months 
  
Pakistan Branchless Banking 
Regulation: for Financial 
Institutions Desirous to 
Undertake Branchless 
Banking, 2011 
Bank led model Different KYC requirements 
to different upper limit of 
transactions for each type of 
account. Four tiered KYC 
requirements. Level 0, basic 
account with low KYC 
requirements and transaction 
limit. Level 1, with adequate 
KYC requirements and 
transaction limits. Level 2, top 
level accounts with full KYC 
requirements and Level 3, 
specific limits and KYC 
requirements for merchants. 
232,757 44 Between 
36 and 48 
months  
14.98 
(5) 
21.87 
(5) 
Philippines Circular No. 649. Bangko 
Sentral Ng Pilipinas, 2009 
Electronic money issuers can be 
classified as (i) bank, (ii) non banks 
financial institutions and (iii) non 
banks institutions registered as 
money transfer agents 
Circular No. 608 determines 
that all types of financial 
transactions shall comply with 
KYC standards. Only full 
KYC requirements. 
Customers must present an 
ID only once. 
272,067 40 Between 0 
and 31 
month  
3.94 (9) 8.06 (9) 
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Table 4d. Countries For Which It Is Too Soon To Make A Call 
Country Regulatory Framework GDP 
(millions 
current 
US$ 
2013) 
GDP 
Rank 
Months 
since 
Beginnin
g 
Agents 
per 
10,000 
adults 
Agents 
per 100 
Km2 
Has specific Mobile 
Money Regulation? 
Allow Non-Banks to Issue Mobile 
Money? 
Has KYC Requirements? 
Tiered KYC  
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
Directive Nº 24 
Relative to the issue of 
electronic money 
Banks, other financial institutions and 
non-banks need a license and can 
provide mobile money services. 
 
Two tiered KYC 
requirements.  
Basic account with a daily limit 
of $100 for Vodacom and 
Tigo and $200 for Airtel, 
monthly limit of $2,500 and 
maximum balance of $3,000. 
Tier two account with daily 
limit of $500, monthly limit of 
$2,500 and maximum balance 
of $3,000. 
29.896 97 35 months 8.81 (1) 1.44 (1) 
Sri Lanka Mobile Payments 
Guidelines No. 1 for 
the Bank led Mobile 
Payment Services. 
Mobile Payment 
Guidelines No.2 for 
Custodian Account 
Based Mobile 
Payment Services 
Under custodian account based system, 
licensed service providers may issue e-
money by accepting physical money 
from customers / merchants and like 
this make cash-ins, cash-outs. 
 
Two tiered KYC requirements 
is implemented in practice by 
eZ Cash. Dialog Classic 
Account, with a daily limit of 
$80 for P2P transactions and 
$80 for utilities, with self-
registration as KYC 
requirement. Dialog Power 
Account with daily transaction 
limit of $40 and $200 for P2P 
and utilities transactions, with 
registration at a Dialog´s 
service point. 
66.722 69 31 months 11.40 
(1) 
24.72 
(1) 
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 All but one of the countries that have had ignition and explosive growth have had regulatory 
regimes in which it was possible for non-banks including MNOs to lead the mobile money schemes. 
The exception is Bangladesh in which bKash, which is affiliated with a bank, operates a mobile 
money scheme that works across all MNOs. Two of the countries that have had failed to ignite, Haiti 
and India, have had regulatory regimes in which banks must operate, or lead in the operation of, 
MMPs. Additionally, in Mexico and Nigeria, the role to be played by MNOs in the development of 
mobile money is restricted by law and in Indonesia, MNOs can participate but must work with banks 
for KYC.  
Other authors have noted that the bank-led model has not shown much evidence of success 
in developing countries and our analysis tends to confirm that. Looking across the 22 countries there 
is only one true success stories for mobile money schemes that have not been lead by MNOs. On the 
one hand, bKash in Bangladesh is a mobile money scheme sponsored by BRAC Bank. Its mobile 
money wallet works with the MNOs that account for most subscribers in that country. So far, 
however, it has been most successful in providing an agent network that people use to pay bills but 
not in the widespread use of mobile money by people and businesses.  
Another success story is led by a bank but with fairly significant involvement by an MNO. 
Easypaisa in Pakistan is sponsored by Tammer Bank and Telenor Pakistan. The participating MNO 
has an important role in Easypaisa. Telenor Pakistan owns 51 percent of Tameer Bank and Easypaisa 
works as a common organization across the two companies. Easypaisa also succeeded in getting a 
dense agent network and in getting national coverage using exclusively on the GSM distribution 
structure. An interesting fact is that the two bank-led successes have a large fraction of their 
transactions made as OTC transactions, which don´t need a registered account to be made. OTC 
transactions account for 85 percent of mobile money transactions both in Bangladesh and Pakistan.42 
The density of the CICO network and the success of the send-receive platform are highly 
correlated across these countries. The median density for the countries that ignited with fast growth 
is 27.6 agents per 10,000 adults, compared with 9.5 for the countries that ignited with slow growth, 
and 2.7 for the countries that have not ignited. These statistics should be viewed with caution since 
they are measured at different points in time in the life cycle of the mobile money schemes. 
While these results are interesting it is not possible to draw conclusions concerning causality. 
It is difficult to recruit agents if there is not enough send and receive activity to support cash-in and 
cash out transactions from which the agents make money. As a result the CICO network and the 
send-receive platform must necessarily grow in tandem. 
The agent density can be viewed as another measure of whether the system has ignited. The 
fact that average density for the countries with ignition and explosive growth is about three times 
that for countries with ignition and slow growth, and about 10 times greater than for countries that 
have not ignited provides confirmation about our assignment of countries into these categories.  
Among the developing countries considered here there is a negative association between the 
success of mobile money schemes and the degree of economic development measured by per capita 
GDP. Median per capita GDP is US$ 1,007 for the countries in which mobile money schemes have !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Greg Chen and  Pial Islam, Consumer Insights from Bangladesh. Is a Transition to Mobile Wallets Underway?, CGAP, March 2014. 
Available at: http://www.slideshare.net/CGAP/is-a-transition-to-mobile-wallets-underway-in-bangladesh and Available at: 
Quarterly Branchless Banking Newsletter Apr-Jun 2014, STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN 4 (2014). Available at: 
http://www.sbp.org.pk/publications/acd/BranchlessBanking-Apr-Jun-2014.pdf  
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ignited with explosive growth, US$ 1,871 for the countries in which mobile money schemes have 
ignited with slow growth, and US$ 2,296 for the countries in which mobile money schemes have not 
ignited. The most successful countries appear to have the lowest GDP. We explore relationship this 
more below. All but one of the countries in which mobile money schemes have ignited with 
explosive growth are relatively small. They have a median population of 29.9 million people and 
range from 10.5 million to 156.6 million. 
It appears that ignition and growth happen quickly or not at all. Based on our qualitative 
assessment of when ignition occurred, for the countries with ignition and explosive growth the 
median time to ignition was 17 months and the longest time was in Tanzania with ignition between 
36 and 48 months, and for the countries with ignition and slower growth the median time to ignition 
was 16 months and the longest time was between 36 and 48 months. By contrast, mobile money 
schemes have been in existence in countries in which none have ignited for a median of 63 months 
with the longest 122 months. 
 
V. Deep Dive Into the Sources of Success and Failure 
 
To provide a richer understanding of the sources of success and failure we examine each of 
the groups in more detail. Table 5 (which repeats Table 1 for the convenience of the reader) lists the 
countries for each of the four categories of success and failure. 
 
Table 5. Mobile Money Scheme Successes and Failures 
Ignition with 
Explosive Growth 
Ignition with 
Weak Growth 
Failed to 
Ignite 
Too Soon to Assess 
Ignition 
No Basis 
Bangladesh Ghana Burkina Faso Democratic Republic 
of the Congo 
 Paraguay 
Cote D’Ivoire Philippines Haiti Sri Lanka  
Kenya Pakistan India   
Rwanda  Indonesia   
Somaliland   Madagascar   
Tanzania  Mexico    
Uganda  Nigeria   
Zimbabwe  South Africa   
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1. Ignition with Explosive Growth !
All but one of the countries in which mobile money schemes have ignited and have seen 
explosive growth are in Africa, and several of those are clustered in a mid-eastern crescent that goes 
from Somaliland to Zimbabwe. We conjecture that this concentration of the strong successes is the 
result of the geographic diffusion of the successful methods for starting mobile money schemes that 
started in Kenya combined with these countries having other features in common. A related factor 
concerns the experience of the MNOs who have led these efforts. Table 6 lists the African countries 
we had examined that ignited strongly and identifies the MNO, where applicable, for each system.   
Table 6. African Countries that had ignited in the Study and MNOs 
Country MNOs with Deployments in the 
Country 
Cote D’Ivoire Etisalat, MTN, Orange 
Kenya Airtel, Safaricom, Orange, Essar 
Telecom 
Rwanda Airtel, MTN and Tigo 
Somaliland Telesom 
Tanzania Airtel, Etisalat, Tigo andVodacom 
Uganda Airtel, UT Mobile, MTN and Orange  
Zimbabwe Econet, NetOne, Telecel 
 
All of these countries are desperately poor. Based on the 2013 International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) ranking of 186 countries, with a higher number reflecting a lower rank, they rank between 173 
for Uganda and 149 for Kenya. Not surprisingly they have very poor physical infrastructure. Of 
particular relevance for mobile money, they have extremely low penetration of banking and poor 
physical transport in terms of road systems and automobiles. Table 7 lists the ranking of these 
countries based on IMF data on per capita GDP and World Bank data based on gasoline 
consumption per capita and where available percent of paved roads and on banks per 100,000 adults. 
What people do have in these countries are mobile phones. For completeness the table shows the 
number of mobile phone subscribers per capita.  
This relationship is consistent with two related hypotheses. On the one hand, people in the 
poorest countries have a much greater demand for mobile money schemes because their alternatives 
for sending and receiving money are so poor. The frictions are greatest in these countries. On the 
other hand, the governments of those countries may choose to impose light regulations, and to allow 
non-banks to operate mobile money schemes, because they are more desperate for a solution and 
because there is such a limited banking system to rely on in any event. The data do not allow us to 
distinguish between these two explanations but both are likely important. 
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Table 7. Rankings of Infrastructure Characteristics for Explosive Ignition Countries 
Country GDP per capita 
2013 (out of 186 
countries)43 
Gasoline 
Consumption 
per capita (out 
of 164 
countries)44 
Roads 
paved 
(out of 121 
countries)
45 
Bank branches 
per 100,000 
adults (out of 
211 countries)46 
Mobile Phone 
Subscribers 
per Capita47 
Bangladesh 159 162 - 142 0.67 
Cote 
D’Ivoire 
147 156 - 170 0.95 
Kenya 149 145 120 163 0.71 
Rwanda 168 - - 147 0.57 
Somaliland - - - - - 
Tanzania 166 159 110 198 0.56 
Uganda 173 - - 194 0.44 
Zimbabwe 161 151 - 155 0.96 
 
Not surprisingly, airtime top up is one of the major ways in which people use mobile money. 
Rather than going to a top-up location people can use the funds in their mobile money account to 
top up their phones. Beyond that the mobile money schemes in these countries have focused on 
sending and receiving money and solving the friction of moving money between families located in 
geographically separate regions of the country with a major use case being transferring money 
between urban and rural areas. Large amounts of domestic remittances are transferred using the 
mobile phone. In Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, 90 percent, 68 percent and 60 percent respectively of 
domestic remittances are made with mobile phones.48 
In some cases the mobile money schemes have provided other basic financial services on 
top of this including savings account, lending, and insurance. Based on the anecdotal evidence bill 
payment is not major use case. Only 6 percent of respondents in a survey of Sub-Saharan countries 
sent money to pay bills with the mobile phone.49 In fact, these are extremely poor countries in which 
most people would not have regular bills for things like electricity For example, in Kenya, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43  Gross Domestic Product per capita, International Monetary Fund (2013). Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/index.aspx  
44 There are a total of 164 countries ranked in 2011. Road Sector Gasoline Fuel Consumption per capita (kg of oirl equivalent), World 
Bank (2011). Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IS.ROD.SGAS.PC  
45 There are a total of 121 countries ranked in 2011. Roads, paved (% of total roads), World Bank (2011). Available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IS.ROD.PAVE.ZS  
46 There are a total of 211 countries ranked in 2012. Commercial Bank Branches (per 100,000 adults), World Bank (2012). 
Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.CBK.BRCH.P5  
47 Population, total, World Bank (2013). Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL and Mobile Cellular 
Subscriptions, World Bank (2013). Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.CEL.SETS  
48 Johanna Godoy, Bob Tortora, Jan Sonnenschein and Jake Kendall, Payments and Money Transfer Behavior of Sub-Saharan 
Africans 23 (2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2116449  
49 Johanna Godoy, Bob Tortora, Jan Sonnenschein and Jake Kendall, Payments and Money Transfer Behavior of Sub-Saharan 
Africans 39 (2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2116449 
! 21!
wealthiest of these countries and the one with the highest penetration of mobile money 
subscriptions, only 23 percent of the population has access to electricity.50 
All but one of the countries in which ignition with explosive growth have occurred have 
followed the “go light regulatory model” pioneered in Kenya. Table 8 summarizes the regulatory 
model for each country. MNOs are allowed to start mobile money schemes sand there are relatively 
few restrictions on them. In all cases the leading mobile money schemes in these countries are 
operated by the MNOs, sometimes in close partnership with the banks. Table 9 lists the major 
mobile money schemes in each country based on the most recent data available and shows the extent 
to which they are lead by an MNO mainly by itself51, an MNO in close partnership with a bank, or a 
bank. 
 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50  Access to Electricity (% of population), World Bank (2010). Available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS  
51 In almost all cases a bank is responsible for holding funds and perform other traditional banking services for the mobile 
money operator. 
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Table 8. Regulatory Model for each country that had explosive ignition 
Country Assessment of 
Regulatory 
Framework 
General Description 
Bangladesh Moderately heavy 
restrictions for MNOs 
to operate. 
Regulation mandates a bank led model for mobile financial services. It 
also enhances the use of MNOs/Solution Providers as branchless 
agents. 
Customer accounts will rest with the bank and will be accessible 
through customers´ mobile device. 
Banks are responsible of protecting the customers. 
Cote 
D’Ivoire 
Minimal restrictions 
for MNOs and other 
non-banks to enter 
E-money issuers can be banks in partnership with MNOs, or a non-
bank that has been granted with a specific license by Central Bank 
Kenya Minimal restrictions 
for MNOs and other 
non-banks to enter 
 Every person that is not a bank or financial institution shall make an 
application to the Central Bank for authorization to operate. 
Rwanda Minimal restrictions 
for MNOs and other 
non-banks to enter 
MNOs are able to issue mobile money with a license from Central 
Bank and funds must be held in a bank managed escrow. 
 
Somaliland No restrictions for 
MNOs and other 
non-banks to enter 
There is no need for a license to operate and almost no enforcement 
from the Central Bank. The MNO Telesom was granted with a 
remittance license.  
Tanzania Minimal restrictions 
for MNOs and other 
non-banks to enter 
Banks and Non banks are allowed to operate with a license from 
Central Bank. 
Uganda Minimal restrictions 
for MNOs and other 
non-banks to enter 
Every provider of mobile money needs a license from Bank of 
Uganda and partner with a financial institution.. The partner financial 
institution shall manage the escrow account. 
Zimbabwe Minimal restrictions 
for MNOs and other 
non-banks to enter 
No formal regulation of the sector, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
implemented a “test and learn” approach 
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Table 9. Main Mobile Money Schemes and Partnerships in Countries with Explosive Growth 
Country Number of 
Mobile 
Money 
Deployments 
Main Mobile Money 
Schemes 
Lead by: In partnership with 
Bank 
Bangladesh 9 bKash 
Dutch Bangla Bank 
BRAC Bank 
Dutch Bangla Bank 
 
Cote D’Ivoire 6 Orange Money 
Moov 
MTN Mobile Money 
Orange 
Etisalat 
MTN 
BICICI 
BIAO 
Ecobank, Societe 
Generale 
Kenya 7 M-Pesa 
Airtel Money 
Orange Money 
yucash 
Safaricom 
 
Airtel 
Orange 
Essar Telecom 
Bank of Africa, 
Equity Bank 
Citigroup, Standard 
Chartered 
Equity Bank 
- 
Rwanda 5 MTN Mobile Money 
Tigo Cash 
Airtel Money 
MTN 
Airtel 
Tigo 
Commercial Bank of 
Rwanda, KCB 
KCB 
- 
Somaliland  ZAAD Telesom - 
Tanzania 5 M-Pesa 
Tigo Cash 
Airtel Money 
ezyPesa 
Vodacom 
 
Tigo 
Airtel 
 
 
Etisalat 
National Bank of 
Commerce 
- 
Citibank, Standard 
Chartered, Tanzania 
Postal Bank 
- 
Uganda 6 MTN Mobile Money 
Airtel Money/Warid 
Orange Money 
M-Sente 
MTN 
Airtel 
 
Orange 
UT Mobile 
Stanbic 
Citibank, Standard 
Chartered 
Standard Chartered 
DFCU Bank and 
PostBank 
Zimbabwe 4 EcoCash 
TeleCash 
Econet Wireless 
Telecel 
- 
- 
 
2. Ignition with Slow Growth 
!
The countries in which mobile money schemes have ignited but have not grown explosively 
are a mixed bag. Their common feature is that they appear to have viable mobile money schemes that 
are used by a small but significant portion of the population but they have not grown explosively; 
mobile money use is far from ubiquitous even though there would seem be a need for it. 
These countries are geographically dispersed with only one in Africa. The range of per capita 
GDP is quite large, from a low of US$1,275 in Pakistan to a high of US$2,791 in Philippines. Airtime 
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top up is an important use of mobile money in these countries. However, in several of them such as 
Pakistan and the Philippines, bill payment is a major use of mobile money. In Philippines, 41 percent 
of Gcash users and 29 percent of SMART money users paid bills in the last 12 months of 2010 using 
the service.52 In Pakistan, 34 percent of the total number of transactions are to pay bills and a large 
portion of the use of mobile money involves people going to agents who use their mobile money 
accounts to transfer funds. Only 3.7 percent of adults in Pakistan have a mobile money account and 
of those only 44 percent are active based on data from June 2014.53 
These countries have generally given MNOs, and other non-banks, latitude to lead mobile 
money efforts. However, the degree of regulation in these countries is somewhat higher than in the 
countries in the “ignition with explosive growth” category. Table 10 summarizes the key features of 
the regulatory regimes for these countries. 
 
Table 10. Regulatory Model for Each Country that had Weak Ignition 
Country Assessment of Regulatory 
Framework 
 
 General Description 
Ghana Moderately heavy restrictions 
for MNOs to operate 
Only Financial-Institution-led model of branchless banking is 
allowed. It can be implemented by agency arrangements or by 
creating a partnership between and FI and Agent Company. 
The Many-to-Many model is the only one permissible in 
Ghana, by which many banks can associate with many 
Telcos. Exclusive partnerships are not allowed. 
Customer account relationship must reside in some FI and 
each transaction must hit the actual customer account. 
Agents can open accounts 
Activities Agents can do: Open BB accounts, Cash/in 
Cash/out, Bills payments, loan disbursement, funds transfers. 
Pakistan Moderately heavy 
restrictions for MNOs to 
operate 
The deployments can be implemented using a one-to-one, 
one-to-many and many-to-many model, but always with a 
bank involved 
Consumer accounts must reside with some FI and each 
transaction must hit the actual customer account and no 
value is stored on the mobile-phone or technology service 
provider. 
The ultimate responsibility of branchless banking lies with 
the FI. The rest of the players act only as agents. 
Agents can perform all the activities, such as account 
opening. 
 
Philippines Minimal restrictions for 
MNOs and other non-banks 
to operate 
According to regulation, electronic money issuers can be 
classified as banks, non-banks financial institution and non 
banks institutions, which have to registered with the BSP as a 
money transfer agent. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52  Demand Study of Domestic Payments in the Philippines, BANKABLE FRONTIER ASSOCIATES (2010). Available at: 
http://bankablefrontier.com/wp-content/uploads//documents/BMGF.PDP-FinalReport-dec2010.pdf  
53  Quarterly Branchless Banking Newsletter Apr-Jun 2014, STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN, July 2014. Available at: 
http://www.sbp.org.pk/publications/acd/BranchlessBanking-Apr-Jun-2014.pdf  
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Banks are more significant players in these countries than in the countries where there has 
been ignition with explosive growth. Table 11 shows the major players in each countries and how 
they are organized. In Pakistan, the mobile money scheme is led by a bank, although often in close 
partnership with an MNO. 
 
Table 11. Main Mobile Money Schemes, Investors and Partnerships in Countries 
with Weak Ignition 
Country Number of 
Mobile 
Money 
Deployments 
Main Mobile 
Money Schemes 
Lead by: In partnership with 
Bank: 
Ghana 4 Airtel Money 
 
MTN Mobile Money 
Tigo Cash 
Airtel 
 
MTN 
Tigo 
Standard Chartered, 
Ecobank, UBA 
CAL Bank, Ecobank, 
Fidelity Bank 
- 
Pakistan 7 Easypaisa 
 
Omni 
Mobicash 
U-Paisa 
Mobile-Paisa 
Timepey 
Telenor 
 
UBL Bank 
Mobilink (Orascom) 
Ufone PTCL 
Warid Telecom 
Zong (China 
Mobile) 
Tameer Microfinance 
Bank- 
- 
Waseela Bank 
- 
Bank Alfalah 
- 
Philippines 2 GCash 
SMART Money 
Globe Telecom 
Smart 
Communications 
GXI 
Bank de Oro (BDO) 
 
3. Ignition Failure 
 
The mobile money schemes started in 8 countries we considered have not ignited and as a 
result mobile money use in these countries is very low. These countries are in several different parts 
of the world and are at different stages of economic development ranging from Madagascar, the 
poorest, to Mexico, the wealthiest. Nigeria, one of the most successful African economies, is on the 
list.   
The most striking feature of these countries is that they have all adopted regulatory 
frameworks that require that banks have significant involvement in mobile money schemes. Table 12 
list the major mobile money schemes in each of the countries and how they are organized. In some 
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cases, such as Nigeria, the MNOs are forbidden from taking a major role in mobile money schemes 
and one are playing a significant role. In other cases, such as Haiti, the dominant MNO has taken the 
lead in developing the mobile money scheme but has been required to work closely with a bank. 
 
Table 12. Main Mobile Money Schemes, Investors and Partnerships in Countries that 
Failed to Ignite 
Country Number of 
Mobile 
Money 
Deployments 
Main Players Mobile 
Money Schemes 
Lead by: In partnership 
with: 
Burkina Faso 2 Airtel Money 
Inovapay 
Airtel 
Independent MMP 
EcoBank 
- 
Haiti 3 TchoTcho 
Lajancash 
Digicel 
Banque Nationale de 
Credit 
ScotiaBank 
- 
India 15 MobileOnMoney 
Airtel Money 
Beam Money 
Independent MMP 
Airtel 
Independent MMP 
- 
J&K Bank 
- 
Indonesia 6 Dompetku 
eCash 
T-Cash 
XL Tunai 
Indosat 
Mandiri Bank 
Telkomsel 
XL Axiata 
- 
Mandiri Bank 
- 
- 
Madagascar 3 Airtel Money 
MVola 
 
Orange Money 
Airtel 
Telma 
 
Orange 
Bank of Africa 
BFV Societe 
Generale, Tiavo 
MICRORED 
Mexico  4 MiFon 
Transfer 
Banorte 
Telcel 
Banorte 
- 
Nigeria 19 Pagatech 
MobileMoney 
Etranzact 
EaZyMoney 
Independent MMP 
GTBank 
Independent MMP 
Zenith 
- 
GTBank 
- 
Zenith 
South Africa 6 WIZZIT 
 
MTN Mobile Money 
 
M-Pesa 
FNB eWallet 
The South African Bank 
of Athens 
MTN 
 
Vodacom 
First National Bank 
Standard Bank 
 
South African Bank 
of Athens 
NedBank 
- 
 
These countries generally have imposed a variety of regulatory requirements on the mobile 
money schemes. Table 13 describes the details of the regulatory requirements. By contrast the 
countries in which mobile money has ignited, and either grown explosively or more slowly, generally 
have very limited requirements, mainly focused on requiring a 100 percent bank reserve for the 
electronic money that has been issued. 
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Table 13. Regulatory Model for Each Country that Failed to Ignite 
Country Assessment of 
Regulatory Framework 
General 
Burkina 
Faso 
Minimal restrictions for 
MNOs or non-banks to 
enter. 
E-money issuers can be banks in partnership with MNOs, or a 
non-bank that has been granted with a specific license by Central 
Bank  
Haiti Moderately heavy 
restriction for MNOs to 
operate. 
Besides, FI need approval from Central Bank to launch mobile 
money services. Agents can open accounts, but the FI should 
make sure agents comply with KYC requirements. 
There are several requirements for agent recruiting which makes 
it difficult for small shops to qualify 
 
India Heavy restrictions for 
MNOs to operate 
Mobile Money Guidelines only permit banks to participate as 
mobile money service providers. MNOs in fact participate with a 
special authorization from Reserve Bank of India, and operate m-
wallets outside the mobile banking world. Banks should offer the 
service only to their own customers. Deposit taking activities can 
only be done by banks. 
The system is restricted to bank account which are KYC 
compliant. 
Indonesia Heavy restrictions for 
MNOs to operate 
It doesn´t allow banks to provide financial services through 
agents 
They cannot outsource KYC rules either. 
Madagascar Moderately heavy 
restriction for MNOs to 
operate. 
MNOs can brand their mobile money services, but they need to 
form a exclusive partnership with a commercial bank to operate. 
Mexico Heavy restrictions for 
MNOs to operate 
Only registered banks or non-banks will be able to offer mobile 
financial services. 
Deposit taking activities shall be done by commercial banks only. 
Account opening can be done by agents. 
Nigeria Heavy restrictions for 
MNOs to operate 
There are three possible models of mobile money services: (i) 
bank focused, (ii) bank-led model and (iii) non-bank led model. 
MNOs are allowed to participate only in the bank-led model (ii) 
as partners. 
There are three types of Mobile Payments Scenario (i) Card 
account based, (ii) Bank account based and (iii) Stored Value (e-
Money) Account Based. 
South Africa Heavy restrictions for 
MNOs to operate 
This is a change introduced from previous Position Papers. Only 
SouthAfrican registered banks will be able to issue electronic 
money. 
The only way for non-banks to enter the market is with a 
sponsorship agreement with a bank. 
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4. Evidence from Recent Entrants 
 
Mobile money schemes started too recently in 3 countries for us to make a determination on 
whether they have ignited.  
Sri Lanka has had mobile money schemes since 2007. However, it initially started with a 
bank-centric model that did not ignite. More recently, in 2011, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka issued 
two guidelines by which it has allow non-banks, subject to some capital requirements, to operate 
mobile money schemes. The largest Sri Lankan MNO, Dialog Axiata, entered in June 2012 and got 1 
million mobile money subscribers (about a third of its total subscribers), of whom 20 percent were 
active, in its first year. The development of the agent network has gone well. Sri Lanka has 11.4 
agents per 10,000 adults in the country after only one year compared with Kenya where there were 
just 2.7 agents per 10,000 adults after a year. 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo has 3 mobile money schemes operated by MNOs. 
In December 2013, 22 months after its start, 9.5 percent of mobile subscribers have mobile money 
accounts and 1.3 percent have active accounts. The agent network is also similar to what explosive 
ignition countries had in the first two years. It reached 2.19 agents per 10000 adults after the first 22 
months of operations, compared to 2.74 in Kenya in a similar time frame, but lower than the 8.05 
Zimbabwe had. 
  
VI. Market Structure, Regulation, and Success 
 
The 11 countries in which mobile money schemes have ignited—either with explosive or 
slower growth—provide a laboratory for examining a variety of issues concerning the market 
structure of mobile money schemes and possible regulatory problems. 
 
1. Natural Monopoly Tendencies 
 
These countries enable us to determine whether mobile money schemes naturally tend to 
monopolies as a result of scale economies and positive feedback effects. The answer is that they do 
not. Table 14 reports the available information on the share of the mobile money schemes in each of 
the countries together with information on the organization of the mobile phone industry. The 
evolution of mobile money schemes tends to track the evolution of the mobile operator business. 
When there is a dominant MNO, as there was in Kenya with Safaricom, that MNO establishes a 
dominant MMP. When there are several competing MNOs, each of them is able to establish a MMP, 
although of course some are more or less successful as doing this. It appears that an MNO can 
operate viable mobile money schemes that are limited to their base of mobile subscribers. 
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Table 14. Mobile Money Market Shares 
Country MNOs with Mobile 
Money Deployments 
Market 
Share 
Mobile Money 
Operators 
Market 
Share 
Bangladesh     
Burkina Faso Airtel 37%54 Airtel Money - 
Cote D’ Ivoire MTN 
Orange 
34% 
36%55 
MTN Mobile Money 
Orange Money 
Celpaid 
E-Tranzact 
33% 
66% 
1% 
-56 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
Airtel 
Vodacom 
Tigo 
28% 
31% 
14%57 
Airtel Money 
M-Pesa 
Tigo Cash 
35% 
33% 
32%58 
Ghana Tigo 
MTN 
Airtel 
13% 
45% 
13%59 
Tigo Cash 
MTN Mobile Money 
Airtel Money60 
49% 
39% 
12% 
Haiti Digicel 
Voila61 
66% 
34% 
TchoTcho 
T-Cash62 
57% 
43%63 
India     
Indonesia Telkomsel 
Indosat 
PT XL 
49% 
23% 
20%64 
T-Cash (Telkomsel) 
Indosat 
PT XL 
Mandiri Bank 
43% 
0% 
0% 
57%65 
Kenya Safaricom 
Airtel 
Orange 
Essar 
68% 
16% 
7% 
8%66 
M-Pesa 
Airtel Money 
Orange Money 
yucash 
71% 
20% 
1% 
8%67 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 Burkina Faso: Q4 2014 Connections, including cellular M2M , GSMA Intelligence (accessed 01/08/2015 at 11:00 AM EST) 
55  2010 Rapport D’Activités, AGENCE DES TELECOMMUNICATIONS DE COTE D’IVOIRE (2010). Available at: 
http://www.atci.ci/images/stories/pdf/rapport_activite/Rapport_ATCI_2010.pdf  
56  IFC Mobile Money Scoping Country Report: Cote D’Ivoire, IFC (2012). Available at: 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/2de255804ef863c8ac1bef3eac88a2f8/MobileMoneyScoping_CI_ENG.pdf?MOD
=AJPERES  
57 Simone Di Castri, Enabling Mobile Money Policies in the Democratic Republic of Congo, GSMA 5 (2014). Available at: 
http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Enabling-Mobile-Money-Policies-in-the-
Democratic-Republic-Of-Congo.pdf  
58 Simone Di Castri, Enabling Mobile Money Policies in the Democratic Republic of Congo, GSMA 8 (2014). Available at: 
http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Enabling-Mobile-Money-Policies-in-the-
Democratic-Republic-Of-Congo.pdf 
59  Telecom Voice Subscription Trends 2014, National Communications Authority of Ghana (2014). Available at:  
http://www.nca.org.gh/downloads/VOICE_Subscriber_Sept_2014.pdf  
60 Adisa King, Tigo Ghana has the highest volume of Mobile Money Users, TECHNOLOGYBANKER, November 8, 2012. Available at: 
http://www.technologybanker.com/mobile/tigo-ghana-has-highest-volume-of-mobile-money-users#.VK6oTiuUfE1  
61  Pascal Simon, IFC Mobile Money Scoping, Country Report: Haiti, IFC 16 (2012). Available at: 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/2fce6c8043efb66095c7bd869243d457/Haiti+Public.pdf?MOD=AJPERES  
62 T-Cash does not longer operates in the mobile money market  
63  Pascal Simon, IFC Mobile Money Scoping, Country Report: Haiti, IFC 24 (2012). Available at: 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/2fce6c8043efb66095c7bd869243d457/Haiti+Public.pdf?MOD=AJPERES 
64  Accelerating Mobile Money in Indonesia: Oportunity Assessment. USAID 8 (2011). Available at: 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnadz190.pdf 
65  Accelerating Mobile Money in Indonesia: Oportunity Assessment. USAID 8 (2011). Available at: 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnadz190.pdf 
66  Quaterly Sector Statistics Report., COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION OF KENYA 9 (2013). Available at: 
http://ca.go.ke/images/downloads/STATISTICS/Sector%20Statistics%20Report%20Q2%202013-14.pdf 
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Country MNOs with Mobile 
Money Deployments 
Market 
Share 
Mobile Money 
Operators 
Market 
Share 
Madagascar Airtel 
Telma 
Orange 
40% 
31% 
29%68 
Airtel Money 
MVola 
Orange Money 
- 
Mexico Telcel  71%69 Telcel 
Mifon 
Boom Financial 
eZuga 
- 
Nigeria   Pagatech 
GTBank 
Etranzact 
Zenith 
56% 
20% 
13% 
6% 
Pakistan Telenor 
Warid 
Mobilink 
Ufone 
27% 
9% 
28% 
16%70 
Easypaisa 
Mobile Paisa (Warid) 
MobiCash 
UPaisa 
UBL Omni 
Waseela 
53% 
4% 
- 
5% 
23% 
9%71 
Paraguay Tigo 
Personal 
55% 
33%72 
Tigo 
Personal 
- 
Philippines SMART 
Globe 
68% 
32% 
Smart Money 
GCash 
77% 
23%73 
Rwanda MTN 
Tigo 
Airtel 
50% 
36% 
14% 
MTN Mobile Money 
Tigo Cash 
Airtel Money 
- 
Somaliland Telesom - ZAAD - 
South Africa MTN 
Vodacom 
33% 
42%74 
MTN Mobil Money 
M-Pesa 
WIZZIT 
FNB eWallet Solutions 
- 
Sri Lanka Dialog 35% eZCash 100%76 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67  Better than Cash: Kenya Mobile Money Market Assessment, USAID (2011). Available at: 
http://nethope.org/assets/uploads/Kenya-Mobile-Money-Assessment.pdf  
68 GPM Case Study: Airtel, Madagascar. GSMA 2 (2013) . Available at: http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/GPM_AirtelCaseStudy190413.pdf 
69 IFC Mobile Money Scoping. Country Report: Mexico. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION 18 (2011). Available at: 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/37512b004a052b268adeffdd29332b51/Mexico+Public.pdf?MOD=AJPERES 
70  Telecom Indicators, PTA (accessed on January 2, 2015 at 5:00 PM EST). Available at: 
http://www.pta.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=269&Itemid=599  
71  Quarterly Branchless Banking Newsletter Apr-Jun 2014, STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN, July 2014. Available at: 
http://www.sbp.org.pk/publications/acd/BranchlessBanking-Apr-Jun-2014.pdf 
72 Informe Paraguay, ASOCIACIÓN IBEROAMERICANA DE CENTROS DE INVESTIGACIÓN Y EMPRESAS DE TELECOMUNICACIONES 
2 (2013). Available at: http://ahciet.net/index.php/estudios/doc_download/87-informe-paraguay 
73 These calculations were made with number of subscribers from different sources and dates. Data for GCash is for 
October 2014 of 3 million subscribers and data for Smart Money is for December 2011 with 10 million subscribers. Smart 
Money logs double-digit growth, SUNOSTAR, March 2, 2012. Available at: 
http://www.sunstar.com.ph/cebu/business/2012/03/05/smart-money-logs-double-digit-growth-209621; Globe GCash 
partners with global crowd funding Kiva, MANILA BULLETIN, October 24, 2014. Available at: https://ph.news.yahoo.com/globe-
gcash-partners-global-crowd-funding-source-kiva-202113176.html and Notes on Regulation of Branchless Banking in the 
Philippines, CGAP (2010). Available at: https://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-Regulation-of-Branchless-
Banking-in-Philippines-Jan-2010.pdf 
74 South Africa: Q4 2014 Mobile Connections, Including M2M, GSMA INTELLIGENCE (2014) 
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Country MNOs with Mobile 
Money Deployments 
Market 
Share 
Mobile Money 
Operators 
Market 
Share 
Mobitel75 23% mCash 
Tanzania Vodacom 
Airtel 
Tigo 
Zantel 
36% 
33% 
23% 
7%77 
M-Pesa 
Airtel Money 
Tigo Cash 
ezyPesa 
- 
Uganda MNO #1 
MNO #2 
MNO #3 
MNO #4 
18% 
49% 
14% 
15%78 
MNO #1 
MNO #2 
MNO #3 
MNO #4 
21% 
49% 
6% 
25%79 
Zimbabwe Econet Wireless 
Telecel 
NetOne 
63% 
19% 
18%80 
EcoCash 
TeleCash 
OneWallet 
100%81 
 
2. Role of the CICO Networks 
 
Successful mobile money schemes in lesser-developed countries require as we discussed 
earlier the simultaneous development of a CICO network. Agents are critical for senders to put 
money into mobile accounts and for receivers to take money out of the mobile accounts. The 
development of the mobile money schemes and the CICO agent networks go hand in hand because 
agents require enough volume to serve and senders and receivers need enough agents to participate. 
The evidence shows, however, that mobile money schemes are able to ignite and grow (explosively 
or more slowly) with a wide range of agent density. Table 15 lists active agents per 10,000 adults and 
active mobile subscribers per capita for the countries under analysis where both pieces of 
information are available. The density of the active agent networks ranges from a low of 1.05 agents 
per 10,000 adults in South Africa to a high of 48.46 in Kenya. Figure 2 plots the data. It suggests that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76 The last data available was before Mobitel started its own Mobile Money Operator. Simone Di Castri, Enabling Mobile 
Money Policies in Sri Lanka: the Rise of eZ Cash, GSMA (2013). Available at: 
http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Enabling-Mobile-Money-Policies-in-Sri-
Lanka-GSMA-MMU-Case-Study-July2013.pdf  
75 Country Overview: Sri Lanka, GSMA 4 (2013). Available at: https://gsmaintelligence.com/files/analysis/?file=131003-sri-
lanka.pdf  
77 Quarterly Telecom Statistics: Quarter 2 (December 2013) Report, Tanzania Communications and Regulatory Authority, 2 (2013). 
Available at: http://www.tcra.go.tz/images/documents/telecommunication/telecomStatsDec13.pdf 
78 The names of the operators were not disclosed in the report. Uganda Mobile Money Assessment and Case Study, USAID 10 
(2012). Available at: 
http://solutionscenter.nethope.org/assets/collaterals/Uganda_Market_Assessment_and_Case_Studies_Final.pdf and Bharti 
Airtel to Buy Warid Telecom Uganda, Subscriber Base to Increase by 60%, VENTURES, April 24, 2013. Available at:. 
http://www.ventures-africa.com/2013/04/bharti-airtel-to-buy-warid-telecom-uganda-subscriber-base-to-increase-by-60/ 
79 The names of the operators were not disclosed in the report. Uganda Mobile Money Assessment and Case Study, USAID 10 
(2012). Available at: 
http://solutionscenter.nethope.org/assets/collaterals/Uganda_Market_Assessment_and_Case_Studies_Final.pdf and Bharti 
Airtel to Buy Warid Telecom Uganda, Subscriber Base to Increase by 60%, VENTURES, April 24, 2013. Available at:. 
http://www.ventures-africa.com/2013/04/bharti-airtel-to-buy-warid-telecom-uganda-subscriber-base-to-increase-by-60/ 
80  Zimbabwe´s Telecom Stats (2013): 103.5% Mobile Penetration Rate, TECHZIM. January 9, 2014. Available at: 
http://www.techzim.co.zw/2014/01/zimbabwes-telecoms-stats-2013-103-5-mobile-penetration-rate/ 
81 The report data if for July 2013. By that time TeleCash and OneWallet had not entered the market yet. Phil Levin, Big 
Ambition Meets Effective Execution: How EcoCash is altering Zimbabwe´s financial landscape. GSMA (2013). Available at: 
http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/EcoCash-Zimbabwe.pdf  
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there is a positive correlation between the density of the CICO networks and mobile money use. The 
simple correlation between active mobile subscribers per capita and agents per 10,000 adults is 0.79. 
 
Table 15. Agents and Active Subscribers 
Country Active Agents 
per 10000 
adults 
Active Mobile 
Subscribers per 
capita 
Bangladesh 13.35 0.029 
Dem Rep of Congo 2.19 0.006 
Kenya 48.46 0.282 
Madagascar 1.07 0.006 
Pakistan 12.50 0.011 
Philippines 1.74 0.054 
Rwanda 13.55 0.144 
South Africa 1.05 0.005 
Zimbabwe 8.05 0.188 
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Figure 2. Relation Between Active Agents and Active Subscribers 
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VII. Conclusions 
!
Seven years after Diners Club ignited the modern payments card industry in 1950 hardly 
anyone other than well-off travelers used payment cards, there was only one successful payment card 
network in the US and probably in the world, and hardly any country other than the US had 
significant domestic payment card business. Many entrepreneurs of course had tried their hands at 
payments cards in those seven years but virtually all of them failed. MasterCard and Visa didn’t even 
start until 16 years after Diners Club started and it took them another decade to gain widespread 
use.82 
This pace seems slow in the Internet Age, when new startups like WhatsApp get hundreds 
of millions of users around the world in a few years. But it is largely the nature of payments. It is hard 
to get people and businesses to change how they pay. There’s inertia. Few want to change unless they 
have a compelling reason to do to. There’s also a coordination problem. Enough senders and 
receivers of money need to move to the new method to get it off the ground. 
It is therefore not surprising, in light of the history of payment systems, and the economics 
of platforms, that we have so few success stories to point to seven years after the promising start of 
M-PESA in Kenya. What’s remarkable, in fact, given the experience of other payment platforms over 
the last half century, is how rapidly M-PESA grew and that it has become essentially ubiquitous so 
quickly. Therefore, comparing the experience in other countries to Kenya is not sound way to 
evaluate mobile money schemes.   
That said newborn mobile money systems face tough odds of growing much or even getting 
out of infancy. The challenges of simultaneously getting people to send and receive money over 
mobile phones and signing up agents to allow people to put cash in or take cash out of their mobile 
wallets are extreme. This study has revealed two key features behind success and failure. 
The first is that the bigger the friction solved the greater the chance of success. This 
principle resolves the paradox the mobile money schemes have done the best in the poorest places in 
the world. The need for a safe, secure, and convenient method for moving money around the 
country dominates the practical difficulty of deploying a send-receive and CICO platform in 
countries that lack basic transportation systems.  
The second is that it is hard enough to ignite a mobile money scheme to succeed given the 
difficulties of getting a critical mass of senders, receivers, and agents on board. The last thing mobile 
money schemes need is another set of burdens. Mobile money schemes have ignited in almost all 
cases in countries that have taken a light hand to regulation and have failed in almost every country 
that has taken a heavy hand and in particular has insisted that regulated banks take a leading role in 
operating the mobile money schemes. Such a stark difference is seldom found in empirical research. 
It strongly suggests that countries face a choice between igniting mobile money systems, with light 
regulation and with no requirement that banks play a central role, or having a mobile money system 
that sputters along at a low level of activity, if that. !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82 DAVID S. EVANS, AND RICHARD SCHMALENSEE,  PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND 
BORROWING (MIT Press, 2nd Edition, 2005) 
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Appendix A 
Determination of Success for the Countries in the Study 
 
Bangladesh 
After three years of operations, mobile money service providers saw a huge growth in the 
volume of transactions in 2013, almost triplicating between January and December – in January 
almost US$ 300 million and in December almost US$ 900 million of value of transactions.83 We 
conclude that the country has ignited and grown explosively. 
Burkina Faso 
There is very little amount of information regarding the developments in Burkina Faso. With 
the information available we know that Inovapay, which launched in October 2009, reached only 
60,000 registered users after 2 years. Those numbers account only for a 0.8 percent of the total 
number of mobile phone users. Additionally, Airtel money launched its service in July 2012, but there 
is no information available to whether or not they gained traction. Since MMPs tend to report good 
news we take this as evidence that it has not done well either. We conclude that the mobile schemes 
have not ignited. 
Cote D’Ivoire 
Schemes in the country have also been successful reaching registered users of 54.7 percent 
of adult population and active users of 10.9 of total mobile phone users. The value of mobile money 
transaction account 7.9 percent of the GDP.  We conclude that the country has ignited and grown 
explosively. 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
The developments of mobile financial services in the country are very recent. Only 20 
months after launching the first service, they already reached 9.5 percent of registered users of the 
total mobile phone users and only 1.30 percent of active users of the total mobile phone users. They 
have a low rate of usage, but it is still too soon to make a determination of whether they are igniting 
or not. 
Ghana 
According to information publicly available, the country has very promising numbers for its 
mobile money services, 35.90 percent of the adult population are registered to the services, as well as 
19.30 percent of mobile phone users. The main concern is that there is no public information about 
the active rate of total subscribers to the services. Additionally, there are articles that describe the 
services in Ghana as “… the country has been slow to take off…”84. To make a final determination 
we considered two pieces of information by which MTN Mobile Money in Ghana, has over two !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
84 Claudia McKay and Peter Zetterli, Unintentional Consequences: Branchless Banking in Ghana, CGAP, January 3, 2013. Available 
at: http://www.cgap.org/blog/unintentional-consequences-branchless-banking-ghana  
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million registered users in the platform85 and of those, around 1 million were active by mid 201486 
Considering only MTN´s active users, the country would have reached a 6 percent of active users of 
the adult population. Therefore, we consider Ghana to be a country that has ignited with slow 
growth. 
Haiti 
The country had a promising beginning with the launch of two mobile money services 
TchoTcho and T-Cash in November and December 2010. After one year of services, both schemes 
had gained 840,000 subscribers, with no information about active accounts. The most recent 
information discloses a total number of active users of 60,000 for the current service providers 
TchoTcho and Lajan Cash, clearly showing failure to ignite.87 
India 
The country has been very slow to take off. There is mainly information available about one 
of the deployments, Money-On-Mobile, which has reached by its own a total users base of active 
user base of 1.1 percent of adult population88. This numbers correspond solely to one provider. 
There is no data available about the rest of the providers in the country. With the information 
available, the schemes failed to ignite. 
Indonesia 
After four years of launching the first mobile money services, the country got a total of 
3,070,000 active users in 2011. Those numbers represent 1.9 percent of adult population that are 
active users. More recent information shows that the number of total registered users reached 
23,867,535 in 2013, which is still only 7.9 percent of total mobile phone users. The schemes failed to 
ignite.89 
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85 Masahudu Ankiilu Kunateh, Ghana: Over Five Million Subscribers Patronise MTN Mobile Money Per Month, ALLAFRICA, June 
18, 2014. Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201406181625.html  
86  MTN Ghana to Expand Mobile Money Service in the Country, AYEKOO! NEWS, August 6, 2014. Available at: 
http://news.ayekoo.com/1.1801302  
87 Ángel González, Push to Make Haiti an e-cash Economy Fell Far Short, THE SEATTLE TIMES, January 10, 2015. Available at: 
http://seattletimes.com/flatpages/nationworld/haiti-shaky-recovery-part-2-earthquake-five-years-later-annivers.html  
88 Matt Averitt, Calpian´s Money-on-Mobile Drives Continued Growth in India, Exceeds 116 Million Cumulative Unique Users, Expands 
Distribution Network to 230,000 Retailers, BUSINESS WIRE, December 23, 2014. Available at: 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20141223005285/en/Calpian%E2%80%99s-Money-On-Mobile-Drives-
Continued-Growth-India-Exceeds#.VLHy6CuUfE0  
89  Accelerating Mobile Money in Indonesia, Opportunity Assessment, USAID (2011). Available at: 
http://egateg.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/D1.%20FS%20Share_Opportunity_Assessment_Final.pdf, Generation Next: Five 
Pathways to TMT growth in emerging markets, LINKLATERS (2013). Available at: 
http://www.linklaters.com/pdfs/mkt/london/Linklaters-TMTGenerationNext-Mobile_money.pdf and Financial Access 
Survey, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. Available at: http://fas.imf.org/Default.aspx 
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Kenya 
The country hosted one of the most successful mobile money schemes in the world, 
reaching more than 26 million of registered users and more than 12 million of active users in early 
2014, which is more than 102 percent of adult population is registered and more than 48 of adult 
population are active users. It is one of the cases of clear explosive ignition. 
Madagascar 
Information from IMF Financial Access Survey shows that the total number of registered 
users was 1,706,406, and the number of active users 141,925 in 2013. Those numbers represent 12.9 
and 1.1 percent of adult population respectively. We conclude that schemes fail to ignite.90 
Mexico 
Information available on subscribers only from IMF Financial Access Survey. Total 
registered mobile money subscribers for 2013 was 2,699,378, which represents 3.4 percent of adult 
population. The schemes failed to ignite91 
Nigeria 
For October 2013, considering the 19 mobile money deployments altogether, they had 
430,000 active mobile money subscribers, which was 0.3% of mobile phone users. Total number of 
registered users reached 6,918,329 for the same year and represented 7.5 percent of adult population. 
The schemes in Nigeria failed to ignite.92 
Pakistan 
The number of subscribers of mobile money services in Pakistan is not very promising; it 
reached 3.3 percent of registered users in total population and 1.5 percent of active users in total 
population in 2014. Nevertheless, the main activity of mobile money in Pakistan comes from OTC 
transactions, which are users that do not have a branchless banking account. 80 percent of the 
activity comes from OTC transactions, 14 percent from M-wallets and 6 percent from agent 
transactions for liquidity purposes.93 With that evidence we consider the schemes in the country as a 
weak ignition. Therefore, if the percent of mobile money is about 7 times  (1/.14) more than the 
percent of active users (1.15) which suggests that the country has ignite but mobile money use has 
not grown explosively. 
Paraguay 
First mobile money services in Paraguay started in July 2010. After almost two years the 
service only reached 60,000 active users, which is 0.9 percent of mobile phone users. There is no !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90 Corinne Riquet, Small Farmers, Mobile Banking, Financial Inclusion in Madagascar, CGAP, October 28, 2013. Available at: 
http://www.cgap.org/blog/small-farmers-mobile-banking-financial-inclusion-madagascar and Financial Access Survey, 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. Available at: http://fas.imf.org/Default.aspx 
91 Financial Access Survey, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. Available at: http://fas.imf.org/Default.aspx 
92 Financial Access Survey, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. Available at: http://fas.imf.org/Default.aspx 
93  Quarterly Branchless Banking Newsletter, Apr-Jun 2014, STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN (2014). Available at: 
http://www.sbp.org.pk/publications/acd/BranchlessBanking-Apr-Jun-2014.pdf  
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information available on the evolution after March 2012.94 Recently, in March 2014, there were 
changes in the regulation making easier for Telcos to operate. 95 Given the information available, 
there is no basis to determine failure or success of mobile money schemes in the country.   
Philippines 
There are two mobile network operators in Philippines, and both launched their mobile 
money services. Latest information available from IMF Financial Access Survey, shows that in 2013 
registered and active users reached 13.2 and 8.8 percent of adult population respectively. This is 
considered weak ignition.96 
Rwanda 
Mobile money developments in Rwanda are successful, since they reached 59.4 percent of 
adult population in 2014 after four years of service. The annual growth in the number of registered 
users from June 2013 – June 2014 was 87 percent. Information from IMF Financial Access Survey 
shows that active users were 26.4 percent of adult population in 2013. These numbers are considered 
explosive ignition.97 
Somaliland 
It becomes difficult to access Somaliland since there are no official statistics regarding 
population or size of the country. Basing the analysis from a study from GSMA98, the number of 
registered users as part of mobile phone users was 33.1 percent after four year of launching the 
services. Additionally there are several articles that sustained that the scheme is very successful.99 
South Africa 
Latest information available shows that in 2013 registered users reached 3.5 of total mobile 
phone users, and active users reached 0.3 percent of mobile phone users for the same period.. With 
the information available the schemes in the country failed to ignited.100 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94 Camilo Tellez and M.Yasmina McCarty, Mobile Money in Latin America: A Case Study of Tigo Paraguay, GSMA (2012). 
Available at: http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/tigopyenfinal.pdf  
95 Mireya Almazan, Financial Inclusion in Paraguay: New Mobile Money Regulation, GSMA, July 21, 2014. Available at: 
http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/financial-inclusion-in-paraguay-new-mobile-money-regulation?  
96 Financial Access Survey, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. Available at: http://fas.imf.org/Default.aspx 
97  Annual Report 2013/2014, NATIONAL BANK OF RWANDA (2014). Available at: 
http://www.bnr.rw/index.php?id=231&eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=1216 and Financial Access Survey, 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. Available at: http://fas.imf.org/Default.aspx 
98 Claire Pénicaud and Fionan McGrath, Innovative Inclusion: How Telesom ZAAD Brought Mobile Money to Somaliland, GSMA 
(2013). Available at: http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Telesom-
Somaliland.pdf  
99 Gianluca Iazzolino, Somaliland has Embraced Mobile Money – but at what price?, THEGUARDIAN, May 19, 2014. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/may/19/somaliland-mobile-money-zaad-inflation-economy-
banking-remittance  
100 Financial Access Survey, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. Available at: http://fas.imf.org/Default.aspx 
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Sri Lanka 
After one year of operations, eZ Cash, the only mobile money service when the information 
was published, had reached a registration of users of 4.9 percent of mobile phones and active users 
of 1 percent of mobile phones. It is still to soon to access whether the scheme ignited or not.101 
Tanzania 
The schemes are well known for its success. In 2013, service providers reached overall 115.9 
percent of registered users as part of total mobile phone users (considering that each mobile user 
could have more than one mobile money account), 40.1 percent of active users of the service as part 
of total mobile phone users and the value of mobile money transaction represented 53.3 percent of 
the GDP at current price of Tanzania.102 
Uganda 
The schemes, like the ones in Tanzania, are also very successful. Considering the 
information available, in 2014 registered users were 90.8 percent of adult population, but had a 
number quite lower for active users in 2012, reaching 9 percent of mobile phones subscribers. In any 
case, for 2014 the value of mobile money transactions reached 39.7 percent of the GDP of 
Uganda.103 
Zimbabwe 
The level of acceptance of mobile money services in Zimbabwe was very high in a short 
period of time. After the first year of operations, the value of mobile money transactions represented 
22 percent of Zimbabwe´s GDP. After two years of operations, the number of active subscribers was 
19.5 percent of total mobile phone subscribers.104 
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101 Simone Di Castri, Enabling Mobile Money Policies in Sri Lanka: The Rise of eZ Cash, GSMA (2013). Available at: 
http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Enabling-Mobile-Money-Policies-in-Sri-
Lanka-GSMA-MMU-Case-Study-July2013.pdf  
102 Simone Di Castri and Lara Gidvani, Enabling Mobile Money Policies in Tanzania: A test and learn approach to enabling market-led 
digital financial services, GSMA (2014). Available at: http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/Tanzania-Enabling-Mobile-Money-Policies.pdf  
103 Martin Luther Oketch, Registered Mobile Money users Reach 17 Million Mark, DAILY MONITOR, August 8, 2014. Available at: 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/Business/Registered-mobile-money-users-reach-17-million-mark/-/688322/2411528/-
/rjcg2z/-/index.html and Uganda Mobile Money Assessment and Case Study, USAID (2012). Available at: 
http://solutionscenter.nethope.org/assets/collaterals/Uganda_Market_Assessment_and_Case_Studies_Final.pdf  
104 4.2m use EcoCash, WEEKENDPOST, June 27, 2014. Available at: http://www.weekendpost.co.zw/articles/2014/06/27/4-
2m-use-ecocash, Phil Levin, Big Ambition Meets Effective Execution: How EcoCash is Altering Zimbabwe´s Financial Landscape, 
GSMA (2013). Available at: http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/EcoCash-
Zimbabwe.pdf and Financial Access Survey, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. Available at: http://fas.imf.org/Default.aspx!
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Appendix B 
Assessment of Length of Time that it Took 
 Schemes to Reach Critical Mass 
 
To estimate the length it took mobile money schemes in each of the countries to reach 
critical mass and ignite, we analyze the evolution, since the moment mobile money schemes start, of 
variables that indicate usage of these schemes. Such variables could be number of transactions, value 
of transactions or active users of mobile money schemes. These variables are not always available and 
when any was available we use total registered mobile money users. This variable is a poor substitute 
of the previously three mentioned variables, but it is the one we used in most cases since it´s the 
more widely available of the four. 
Observing the evolution in the usage of the schemes, ignition is determined the moment the 
growth path in the usage changes completely, showing an increase in the growth rate, a change in the 
tendency and an inflection point in the usage of the schemes. That is the moment we consider as the 
ignition point. The length is measured since the moment mobile money schemes start, until the 
ignition point. This is expressed in most cases in number of months, quarters or years it took to 
reach that point. 
Below we make the determination of each of the countries in each of the four categories of 
determination of success. When there is enough data points for the country, a graph is presented. 
Countries that had ignited strongly 
Bangladesh 
 
There is an inflection point an ignition between month 13 and month 26 after launch. 
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Cote D’Ivoire 
 
There is an inflection point in month 45 after launch. 
Kenya 
 
There is an inflection point in month 11 after launch. 
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Rwanda 
 
There is an inflection point between month 29 and month 35 after launch 
Somaliland 
 
There is an inflection point in quarter 5, between.13 and 15 months after launch 
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Tanzania 
 
There is an inflection point during fourth year of operations, between month 36 and month 
48 since launch. 
Uganda 
 
There is an inflection point in month 10 since launch. 
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Zimbabwe 
 
There is an inflection point 2 months after launch 
 
Countries that had ignited but weakly so 
Ghana 
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Is is difficult to assess an inflection point with the data available. It should had been between 
month 0 and month 25 after launch. 
Pakistan 
 
There is an inflection point between month 36 and month 48 after launch. 
Philippines 
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It is difficult to access an inflection point with the data available. Using data of registered 
users, inflection point should had been between 0 months and 31 months after launch. 
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